For Foucault, the modern era is marked by the emergence of a new kind of power-what he comes to call "bio-power" 1 -that differs from the classical, "juridical" models of power, captured so well by John Austin"s (early 19 th -century) view of law (and, ergo, state power) as a command of the sovereign backed by a threat of sanction. "We need to cut off the King"s head," says Foucault, adding that "in political theory that still has to be done." 2 The agents of power and repression are no longer (or no longer only) the agents of the "King" or the state, and so the exclusive questions of political theory should no longer concern the justifications for and limits upon the exercise of centralized power by "the King." Rather, in the era of "bio-power," repression and regulation operate far more insidiously, for now it is the individual himself who is the agent of his or her own "oppression" and discipline.
How are individuals co-opted for their own oppression? According to Foucault, it So what distinguishes "judgments of normality" in the putatively "modern" era of bio-power? It can not be the emphasis on the regulation of the "body" per se, since
Foucault"s own work-especially in the later volumes on The History of Sexuality 3 -makes clear how far back these concerns go. 4 Rather, Foucault"s work suggests that what marks judgments of normality in the modern era is that their authority derives from "the human sciences," that is, from claims about how one ought to be whose authority is, in the first instance, epistemic rather than moral or religious.
5
Even this, however, does not yet suffice to distinguish the era of bio-power, since, for example, orthodox religious traditions typically ground their moral authority in a kind of epistemic authority (recall: "the truth will set you free"), such as knowledge of the divine will in one form or another. What really distinguishes the claim of epistemic authority in the era of bio-power is that the human sciences claim a certain distinctively modern version of such authority: for they present themselves as grounded in claims 3 See esp. The Uses of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, both trans. Robert
Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1988 -1990 .
4 Foucault certainly thinks, to be sure, that the techniques for regulating and "disciplining" bodies have grown more sophisticated in the modern era.
The classic study is, of course, his Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977 Indeed, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault says he is exploring "the present scientificolegal complex from which the power to punish derives its bases, justifications, and rules," 11 meaning that the state (as the force directly behind the "legal" part of the complex) remains a central actor in this story of oppression in the era of bio-power. being. I take it that at least part of Foucault"s aim is to question these conceptions of "normal flourishing." Finally, a consequence of the epistemic authority accorded particular human sciences is that their claims affect moral attitudes about their subjectmatters and, in particular, tend to implicate a conception of the self, both its nature and its (morally) proper governance.
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To sum up: Foucault wants to criticize and challenge each of these moral claims:
he wants to argue against granting the claims of the human sciences practical authority over our lives (though not because he rejects, as Nietzsche does, the authority of truth, but because he rejects the idea that the human sciences have the requisite access to the truth); he wants to challenge the implicitly and explicitly moralized views of normality and normal flourishing; and he wants to call attention to and raise questions about the moral attitudes, and the ethical conception of the self in particular, that emerges from the human sciences. The first challenge seems to me the most inchoate in Foucault, though like the other two it depends crucially on the challenge to the epistemic authority of the human sciences. marking a purported kind of person, not just physiologically, but morally. So too with the "poor vagabonds, criminals, and "deranged minds"" 17 to whom Foucault soon turns: they too have their own "values and images attached" to them and the "meaning" of their exclusions must be decoded as well. As he puts it later: "The asylum was substituted for the [leper] house, in the geography of haunted places as in the landscape of the moral universe." 18 So one aim of Foucault"s work is to bring out the moral status of those condemned and excluded on grounds that were not always explicitly moral, or that blurred the line between the "moral" and "non-moral" considerations.
14 Foucault himself says that "the prison was linked from its beginning to a project for the transformation of individuals," but in this respect it is no different from any of the other institutions to which he has turned his attention:
"The prison was meant to be an instrument, comparable with-and no less perfect than-the school, the barracks, or the hospital, acting with precision upon its individual subjects." "Prison Talk," in Power/Knowledge, pp. 39-40. 15 In assessing the success of Foucault's critique, we will later examine The
History of Sexuality.
16 Madness and Civilization, p. 6.
17 Id. at 7.
18 Id. at 57.
For example, the Parisian "Hôpital Général," which Foucault treats as representative of "the great confinement" of the 1660s (when one out of every 100
Parisians was put away!), 19 had at its official mission "preventing "mendicancy and idleness as the source of all disorders,"" 20 so that the community, in effect, "acquired an ethical power of segregation, which permitted it to eject, as into another world, all forms of social uselessness. have not only the aspect of a forced labor camp, but also that of a moral institution responsible for punishing, for correcting a certain moral "abeyance"….The Hôpital Général has an ethical status….
[I]t is in this context that the obligation to work assumes its meaning as both ethical exercise and moral guarantee…The prisoner who could and who would work would be released, not so much because he was again useful to society, but because he had again subscribed to the great ethical pact of human An important phenomenon, this invention of a site of constraint where morality castigates by means of administrative enforcement….
[I]n this great confinement of the classical age, the essential thing-and the new event-is that men were confined in cities of pure morality….
22
The subtext of this historical account is that the underlying moral rationale for confinement is, itself, of dubious merit, but what really matters for Foucault is that this socio-historical phenomenon was merely a prelude to the modern era of "scientific"
psychiatry. In other words, this spectacle of moral policing under the guise of a hospital (or medical care) was not a peculiarity of this earlier era alone. Even purportedly great "medical" reformers of the treatment of mental illness in the late 18 th -century like Pinel of France were still writing: "How necessary it is, in order to forestall hypochondria, melancholia, or mania, to follow the immutable laws of morality!" 23 As Foucault explains, "[T]he asylum becomes, in Pinel"s hands, an instrument of moral uniformity and of social denunciation," in which to "guarantee bourgeois morality a universality of fact and permit it to be imposed as a law upon all forms of insanity." 24 Foucault continues:
22 Id. at 58-60.
23 Id. at 197.
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[W]hile Pinel…strongly asserted that his moral action was not necessarily linked to any scientific competence [unlike later practitioners of psychiatry], it was thought, and by the patient first of all, that it was in the esotericism of knowledge, that the doctor had found the power to unravel insanity; and increasingly the patient…would alienate himself in the physician, accepting entirely and in advance all his prestige, submitting from the very first to a will he [what Foucault means, I take it, by "positivism"]) authority they have not really earned.
The implicit invitation Foucault presents to the reader is to rethink and resist the conceptions of normality (of sanity and madness, of sexual normalcy and perversion, of criminality and law-abindingness, and so on) that permeate these systems of control.
I began by suggesting that Foucault"s work is motivated by its own ethical impulse, namely, to liberate modern individuals from a kind of self-imposed subjugation.
At the same time, as we have seen, Foucault wants to indict other ethical norms that he sees playing a role in this subjugation. But the idea of subjugation or oppression is itself a normative one, presupposing that we have a handle on what constitutes wrongful treatment of the individual in virtue of distorting or blocking his flourishing. The conception of flourishing that Foucault values, the kind of flourishing that presumably grounds his indignation at the practical authority underwritten by such dubious epistemic credentials, remains, alas, a bit vague. As Michael Walzer, in a highly critical essay, put it: Foucault aims not "for revolution but for local resistance," 26 i.e., resistance to the conception of "normalcy" put forward by particular human sciences. It is a characterization Foucault effectively endorses:
The role for theory today seems to me to be just this: not to formulate the global systematic theory which holds everything in place, but to analyse the specificity of mechanisms of power, to locate the connections and extensions, to build little by little strategic knowledge. How seriously should we take Foucault"s critique? Foucault himself, it should be recalled, exempts from his critical gaze non-"dubious" sciences like physics and chemistry, focusing instead on those human sciences whose "epistemological profile" is "a low one." 28 But even with respect to the latter, he does not actually argue, as some have done, for the "lowness" of the epistemological profile, instead calling attention to One day in 1867, a farm hand from the village of Lapcourt, who was somewhat simple-minded, employed here then there, depending on the season, living handto-mouth…was turned in to the authorities. At the border of a field, he had obtained a few caresses from a little girl, just as he had done before and seen done by the village urchins round about him…So he was pointed out by the girl"s parents to the mayor of the village, reported by the mayor to the gendarmes, led by the gendarmes to the judge, who indicted him and turned him over first to a doctor, then to two other experts….What is the significant thing about this story? The pettiness of it all; the fact that this everyday occurrence in the life of village sexuality, these inconsequential bucolic pleasures, could become, from a certain time, the object not only of a collective intolerance but of a judicial action, a medical intervention, a careful clinical examination, and an entire theoretical elaboration.
30
The same underlying events might, of course, be described rather differently: namely, that up until the time of this incident, pedophilia and child sexual abuse had been routinely tolerated-treated as an "inconsequential bucolic pleasure[]" in Foucault"s startling phrase-but gradually people came to realize that "simple-minded" men being masturbated by young girls was not such a good thing (not so "inconsequential"), and thus the modern scientific study of pedophilia, and its harms, commenced. Why we should prefer Foucault"s version to the alternative is unclear. Why not say, instead, that in the 19 th -century a certain psychological type was discovered, namely, the pedophile, and that the harms of pedophilia were also discovered, even if the 19 th -century versions of these discoveries have been superseded by a century of investigation? Absent answers to questions like this, Foucault"s critical project is in danger.
To be sure, even if Foucault does not himself supply the arguments, the reasons for being skeptical about the epistemic claims of many of the contemporary human sciences have been well-articulated by others. 31 Those who want Foucault"s critique to be taken seriously must-perhaps drawing on extant put forward a systematic critique of the truth of the conceptions of "normality" at work in the contemporary human sciences, from psychiatry to criminology. Foucault has given us reasons to be suspicious of such claims; now we need to know whether they are true or false.
30 History of Sexuality, p. 31.
